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The Uniform Commercial Code draftsmen apparently were aware that
conditional sales statutes in many states were outmoded and that business
practices were changing so rapidly it seemed more desirable to draft
laws having the free flow of commercial transactions as an objective. The
Code provisions reducing formalities to a minimum' 2
 seems to be sound
practice, in that courts will be free to interpret and apply flexible rather
than rigid standards to conditional sales contracts.
BRUCE N. SACHAR
Constitutional Law—Export-Import Clause—State's Power to Tax
Exports—Sales Tax.—Cough Industries, Inc. v. State Board of Equal-
ization.'—The defendant, a California manufacturer of electrical supplies,
sold goods in California to a purchaser for direct export to Saudi Arabia.
Because the defendant could not meet the specified packaging requirements,
the agreement provided that the defendant should deliver the goods to •a
California export packer to be designated by the purchaser. When the
goods were ready for packaging, the defendant delivered them to the packer
who specially packed and crated them for shipment overseas. The packer
then delivered them to an ocean carrier for transportation to Saudi Arabia.
Pursuant to the sales contract title passed from the defendant to the pur-
chaser upon delivery of the goods to the packer. Under the California sales
tax statute, the state levied an assessment on the defendant as the seller of
these goods. The tax was paid under protest and proceedings were brought
to recover the payment. The Superior Court of Sacramento County, Cali-
fornia, held the tax to have been improperly assessed because the goods
were in foreign commerce immediately upon leaving the defendant's hands
and, therefore, constitutionally could not be taxed by California. The
District Court of Appeal, for the Third District reversed, 2 holding that
nothing had occurred prior to or at the time of assessment to take the
goods out of the general mass of property in the state and that they were
not in export until after the packer had completed his packaging pursuant
to the purchaser's orders and had turned them over to the motor carrier
for delivery to the ocean carrier. On appeal the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court and reversed that of
the District Court of Appea1.3
The decision of the California Supreme Court seems at variance with
the authorities establishing the rule that goods do not cease to be part of
the general mass of property within the state subject to nondiscriminatory
state taxation until they have been shipped, or "entered" with a common
carrier for transportation to another state, or have been started upon such
transportation in a continuous route or journey.' This rule, although for-
12 UCC iii 9-110, 9-402.
1 51 Cal. 2d 746, 336 P.2d 161 (1959), cert. den. 359 U.S. 1011 (1959).
2 332 P.2d 378 (1958).
3 Note 1 supra,
4 Coe v. Eroll, 116 U.S. 517 (1886) ; Turpin v. Burges, 117 U.S. 504 (1886) ;
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mulated to determine the -validity. ,
 under the commerce clause of a non-
discriminatory state tax, is equally applicable to cases arising either under
Art. I,' § 10, cl. 2, which restricts the states in taxing imports or exports,
or under Art. I, § 9, cl. 5, which prohibits Congress from laying any tax
upon "articles exported from any state."' The rule is equally applicable
to ad valorem property taxes and sales taxes—the issue in each situation
being whether the goods are in the "stream of exports" at the moment they
are taxed. If the articles have not on tax day entered foreign commerce,
even though they are destined for export, they are subject to state ad
valorem property taxes' And the United States Supreme Court has held
in Empresa Siderugica S.A. v. County of Merced,T that this is so even
though the goods are being packed, or, after having been packed, are
awaiting the carrier.
In Empresa, a property tax levied on the purchaser on various parts
of a cement plant which had been sold and dismantled for shipping to
South America was upheld on parts that were (1) crated and ready for
shipment, (2) dismantled but not yet packed, and (3) not yet dismantled.
The United States Supreme Court held that none of the goods in the three
categories had entered the "stream of exports" even though the dismantler
was a carrier. In the instant case, none of the goods were packed at the
moment of taxation and therefore Empresa should have controlled, espe-
cially since the packer was not a carrier.
In Joy Oil Co., Ltd. v. State Tax Cotnmission,8 a Canadian purchaser
bought in Michigan 1,500,000 gallons of gasoline, certified that it was
purchased for export and shipped it to Detroit under bills of lading
marked "For Export to Canada." Because of the shortage of shipping
space, the purchaser held a large portion of the gasoline in storage at
Dearborn, Michigan for eighteen months. The Supreme Court held the
goods properly subject to state taxation pointing out that while in storage
the gasoline might have been diverted to domestic markets. Therefore, the
gasoline did not fall within the protection of the Export-Import Clause
which meant to confer immunity from local taxation upon property being
exported, and was not meant to relieve property' eventually to be exported
from its share of the cost of local services. The applicability of this argu-
ment to the principal case is obvious.
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court held that "where an article
is manufactured and sold in one of the states for export to a foreign country,
Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418 (1904) ; Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66
(1923) ; Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946) ;
Empresa Siderugica S.A. v. County of Merced, 337 U.S. 154 (1949).
5 Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, supra note 4. Empresa
Siderugica S.A. v. County of Merced, supra note 4.
Coe v. Eroll, 116 U.S. 517 (1886) ; Turpin v. Burges, 117 U.S. 504 (1886) ;
Thompson v. United States, 142 U.S. 471 (1891) ;- Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418
(1904) ; Hughes Bros, Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469 (1926) ; Empresa Side-
rugica S.A. v. County of Merced, 337 U.S. 154 (1949) ; Joy Oil Co., Ltd. v. State
Tax ComMission, 337 U.S. 286 (1949).
T 337 U.S. 154 (1949).
8 337 U.S. 286 (1949).
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it is free from state sales tax Undei%.the import-export Isic] .,clause of ithe
United States if at-the time title passed the certainty' of the foreign desti-
nation was plain:"° The 'validity of this statement; is even ,more :dubious
in light of the'repeated assertions of the Supreme Court that the intent to
export does 'not make articles. exports. 1° . • • •.' •;•
Of course, the Supreme Court has denied' certiorari, but that ',fact is
not indicative of any change 'of doctrine On-the:part of the. Couit." In
any event, the problem in• the'.instant case could easily have been avoided.
If title to the 'goods had not passed• from the manufacturer..to' the purchaser
at the time they were delivered-to the packer,' but had. been retainedr:by the
seller until delivery to the ocean carrier, the - transaction 'would !clearlY., not
have been subject to the state sales. tax because .the act sought to': bettaxed
would then be the act committing the goods to export." Less• clear,' how-
ever, is'the tax 'position.of. the seller who turns over-title under the'lcontract
at the • time of delivery of the goods to a , dOmesticiCarrier: foi.;transshipment
to 'the • ocean' carrier. Hughes' Bros. Timber Co. V. .Minnesota, 3. held under
the' Comtherce Clause, that ,an.ad , valorem, propertyaax may not be -levied
by the state while the goods were in .transit, but prior to their: having been
received•.by the interstate , carrier. While .goods in 'foreign commerce have
been recognized as being entitled to greater immunity 'from taxation under
Art. I, § 9, cl:' 5 and'Ait. I; § 10, cl. '2, than goods in interstate commerce
under the Commerce Clause, 14 the Supreme.Court - has irrErnpresa 'left open
the 'extent -of the applicability 'of 'the Hughes. rule. vto foreign , commerce
situations.
PETER A. DONOVAN
t: r	 • Student Editor-in-Chief'
	
•i,• •	 i	 ,•
ConstitUtional LaNir—Off-Street Parking PrOvisitin in Municipal Zoning
Ordinance Held Invilid'A's a rielegation Of Legislative Power.-State
ix rel. Associated' Lauri
,
 and Investment'Cokp. Citit bf Lynel-
hurst.1—Mandownr brought an action for ma.' ndainus in the OhiO Coitrt of
Appeals to compel' a building inspector to issue a permit for the alteration of
an office building. The inspector had preViously denied the perrnit because
of non-compliance with,off-street parking proVisions in the loCal zoning ordi-
nance. The Court of Appeals granted the writ and, on appeal, the Ohio
Supreme Court affirmed. HELD: Provisions of the zoning ordinance which
(1) required that all buildings other ,than dwellings have off-street parking
0 51 Cal. 2d 746, 749, 336 P.2d 161, 163.
10 See cases note 6 supra.	 .	 .
11 See separate opinion of Frankfurter, J., in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show,
338 U.S. 912 (1950). •
12 Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66 (1923). 	 ,
13 272 U.S. 469 (1926).	 • 	 ,
14 See Fairbanks v. United States, 181 U.S. 283 (1901) ; United States v. Hvoslef,
237 U.S. 1 (1914) ; and Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S 19 (1914).
1 154 N.E.2d 435 (Ohio St. 1958).
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